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I. INTRODUCTION
J apan maintains restrictive import quotas on many products which
are produced domestically,1 although Japan is a net importer of food
and relies extensively on foreign sources for certain farm products. 2 Japa-
nese agriculture, although technologically advanced, is comparatively
inefficient to U.S. agriculture in terms of productivity and the costs of
cultivation.
3
The agricultural sector in Japan contrasts sharply with the industrial
sector. Whereas Japanese industries are well recognized for both their ef-
ficiency and the quality of their automobile, steel, and consumer electron-
ics exports, Japanese farmers export few products. The tremendous
growth in Japanese industrial expansion since World War II has been
possible only because Japan has had relatively free access to enormous
foreign markets. The Japanese economy has grown on the basis of such
exports, and sales abroad have permitted it to amass a merchandise trade
surplus which exceeded $35 billion in 1982." Japan's trade surplus with
the United States alone equaled approximately $20 billion in 1982.5
Japan, for both cultural and trade-policy reasons, remains relatively
closed to many of the products of its trading partners, although Japan
until recently, has enjoyed almost unimpeded access to foreign markets
* Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell; J.D., Georgetown University (1977); B.A.,
State University of New York (1973).
1 Quotas, for example, are imposed on the imports of fresh oranges, orange and
grapefruit juice, beef, apple juice, canned pineapple, grape juice, fruit puree and pastes and
tomato sauce. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREIGN AGRI-
CULTURE CIRCULAR 22 (Mar. 1983) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR I].
Kuroda, The Present State of Agriculture in Japan, in U.S.-JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL
TRADE RELATIONS 91, 141 (E. Caste & K. Hemmi eds. 1982).
3 F. SANDERSON, JAPAN'S FOOD PROSPECTS AND POLICIES 56 (1978).
The amount of Japan's merchandise trade surplus is misleading because Japan incurs
a substantial deficit in services. Destler, The Wrong Approach to Japanese Trade, Wash-
ington Post, Mar. 16, 1983, at A23, col. 2. The situation of the United States in recent years
has been the reverse-a merchandise trade deficit and a surplus in services trade.
Id. at A23, col. 1.
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for its goods.6 Japan's protectionist trade policy is particularly pro-
nounced in the area of agricultural trade. In recent years, attention has
focused increasingly on Japan's restrictions on agricultural imports.
These restrictions have become symbolic of what many U.S. statesmen
and businessmen consider to be Japan's unwillingness to abide domesti-
cally by the same principles of international trade which have permitted
it to prosper.
It is said that Japan plays by two sets of rules. On one hand, Japa-
nese business, assisted by its government,7 is perceived as preying upon
foreign markets since its access to such markets is protected by interna-
tional trade rules. Simultaneously, Japan is viewed as an insulated society
intent upon limiting the access of foreign traders to domestic markets.
These perceptions, simplistic as they may be, are based on existing fac-
tors that affect Japan's relations with her trading partners.'
This contradiction in trade policy is not unique to Japan, but is re-
flected in varying degrees in the policies of every major trading nation.
Nonetheless, the allegation that the Japanese market has been more
closed than others is not without factual basis. Japan's limitations on ag-
ricultural trade have created a particularly acute difficulty in U.S.-Japa-
nese economic relations.9
II. JAPAN'S RESTRICTIVE AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY
Japanese agriculture is composed of small land holdings totaling only
fourteen million acres.10 It is hopelessly inefficient and costly when com-
pared with U.S. agriculture. This factor has resulted in Japan's protec-
tionist agricultural policy.
Japan imposed quotas on over 200 agricultural and non-agricultural
items as recently as the mid-1960's. 1 The justification for such restric-
tions was Japan's balance of payments problems. By 1963, however, the
6 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, JAPANESE BARRIERS TO U.S.
TRADE AND RECENT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TRADE INITIATIVES 1-2 (Nov. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as JAPANESE BARRIERS TO U.S. TRADE].
The Ministry of Industrial Trade and Investment (MITI) plans and coordinates Ja-
pan's industrial and trade policy. See generally Industrial Policy: An Unfair Trade Prac-
tice?, 41 CONG. QUARTERLY, No. 4, at 211-214 (Jan. 29, 1983).
8 See JAPANESE BARRIERS TO U.S. TRADE, supra note 6, at 1-3.
o The United States has brought 13 of Japan's quotas on agricultural commodity im-
ports to the attention of the GATT. President Reagan Visits Japan and Korea, BUSINESS
AMERICA, Oct. 31, 1983, at 2, 6-7.
10 The average size of a farm in Japan is about one hectare or approximately 1.2 acres.
This compares with an average farm size of 188 acres in the United States. F. SANDERSON,
supra note 3, at 56.
1 FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, TRADE STRATEGY WITH
JAPAN 2 (1982) (Undated Briefing Paper on Japan).
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International Monetary Fund had determined that the balance of pay-
ments difficulties had been corrected.12 Nonetheless, little action was
taken to dismantle the restrictive trade practices until recently. Such ac-
tions that have been taken, moreover, have been a product of pressure
from the United States and the European Economic Community.
Japan's food policy has been based largely on three factors: (1) na-
tional self-sufficiency; (2) low agricultural productivity; and, (3) the pro-
tection of farm income. The Japanese populace clings to the notion that
it must preserve partial food self-sufficiency. For those Japanese who
have experienced the deprivation of food shortages during both World
War H and the immediate post-war period, the issue of food security is
not totally unwarranted.1 3 Japan however, has seen its self-sufficiency in
food products decline from approximately 90 percent in 1960 to 73 per-
cent in 1978.14 Since 1978, the level of self-sufficiency has diminished
even further. The small size of Japanese farms has made it more difficult
for the nation to remain self-sufficient in food as the Japanese diet im-
proved and became more diversified.
The national concern with self-sufficiency, coupled with the increas-
ing inability of small land holdings to provide the desired level of produc-
tion, has caused the Japanese government to protect farm income in or-
der to ensure its continued viability.1 5 Japan utilizes price supports and
import restrictions in order to protect the agricultural sector.16 This pol-
icy forces Japanese consumers to pay prices for food far in excess of world
market prices. 7 Yet, Japanese fears about a secure food supply and the
12 Id.
13 The issue of food security was revived as a result of the embargo on soybean exports
established by the United States in 1974 under the short supply provisions of the Export
Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 7, 83 Stat. 845 (1969)(codified at 50 U.S.C. 2406).
The Export Administration Act has since been revised but still contains similar short supply
provisions. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified at
50 U.S.C. 2406). However, food security cannot explain the quantitative and other restric-
tions imposed on products like ketchup.
"I U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, JAPAN: AGRICULTURAL POLICY (briefing paper derived
from data published by Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF)).
In 1975, the National Agricultural Council requested a major effort to halt the decline in
food self-sufficiency. The plan was adopted by the cabinet in 1975. F. SANDERSON, supra
note 3, at 26.
"I Egaitsu, Japanese Agricultural Policy, in U.S.-JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL TRADE RELA-
TIONS 148-180 (E. Caste & K. Hemmi eds. 1982).
16 Id. To protect and support small scale agriculture Japan has introduced price and
supply stabilization programs based on the Agricultural Basic Law of 1961 and the Food
Control Law of 1942. The Agricultural Basic Law permits controls to be imposed on imports
if they threaten domestic farm prices.
'7 See generally F. SANDERSON, supra note 3. Thus, the Japanese pay approximately
five times more for choice cuts of beef than a U.S. consumer would. Id. at 22. The cost of
price supports in terms of government expenditures is estimated at $3.5 billion. Id. at 23.
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political strength of farm groups make it difficult to alter agricultural
policy.
The organization of the farm cooperatives in Japan explains the in-
fluence they wield in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).' s Farm groups,
although numerically significant, have had their influence further en-
hanced by the failure to redistrict the country to reflect large population
shifts from rural to urban centers.19 The farm vote also has been impor-
tant because of its stability. Farmers who have joined in a conservative,
political coalition with Japan's large businesses are the most reliable sup-
porters of the LDP. Moreover, as the margin by which the LDP exerts
control over the Japanese Diet has declined, the farm vote has taken on
increasing importance as a swing vote.20 Consequently, the LDP has made
every effort to avoid their alienation.
Another explanation for the importance of the farm group is the lack
of grass roots organization in the LDP.21 The National Union of Agricul-
tural Cooperatives (NUAC) and the Zenchu 22 derive much of their
strength from their ability to organize successfully. The LDP depends on
this organizational structure for its basic support. Although membership
in the farm groups is voluntary, virtually all farm families are affiliated.2'
This structure provides the farmers with almost unparalleled political
strength.
Over 80 percent of the LDP Diet members come from rural dis-
tricts.24 The farm groups, as organized political coalitions, therefore, can-
not be ignored. The failure to reapportion districts to more accurately
reflect the population shifts has provided farmers with much greater po-
litical influence than they otherwise would possess. 5 In terms of popula-
tion, rural districts are frequently over-represented relative to urban dis-
tricts by a factor of three to one to as much as five to one.26 The LDP
would almost certainly lose control of the government if farm groups were
18 The Liberal Democratic Party or LDP has controlled the Japanese Government for
over 25 years. Its dominance has been based on a conservative coalition including business
and farm groups. Hemmi, Agriculture and Politics in Japan, in U.S.-JAPANESE AGRICUL-
TURAL TRADE RELATIONS 219, 220-221 (E. Caste & K. Hemmi eds. 1982).
19 Fukui, The Japanese Farmer and Politics, in THE JAPANESE ECONOMY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 156 (I. Frank ed. 1975).
20 Id. at 156, 157.
2'1 Id. at 156.
22 The Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, known in Japan as "Zenchu," is a
farm organization that weilds significant political power in Japan. See Washington Post,
Nov. 21, 1982, at A-32, col. 1
23 Fukui, supra note 19, at 154.
24 Id. at 156.
25 Hemmi, supra note 18, at 223-229.
28 Id. at 225.
Vol. 15:569
QUANTITATIVE AGRICULTURAL RESTRICTIONS
to significantly alter their party affiliation. 27 Consequently, the party has
been unwilling to further alienate farmers. Significant disputes with farm-
ers have already developed as a result of the government rice policy. A
pronounced reluctance thus exists to further disrupt the relations be-
tween the LDP and farm groups by liberalization of the import policy.
The composition of the farm population, however, is itself changing,
threatening potential repercussions for its continued political strength.
Between 1960 and 1972, farm population dwindled from 14.5 to 6.9 mil-
lion.2 Moreover, 85 percent of the 5.2 million families involved in farm-
ing in 1971 were only partially engaged in cultivation.29 A significant per-
centage of the income of farm families is now derived from sources
outside of agriculture.2 0 The age structure of the farm population is
changing as well. In 1970, approximately 20 percent of the farm workers
were 34 years or younger.3 1 The equivalent figure in industry was 55 per-
cent.32 By 1980, the average age of farmers who derived the majority of
their income from agriculture was 51.33 By 1972, only 2.2 percent of the
population of secondary school students were entering farming. In 1960,
27 percent of the working population were farmers.3 ' This figure had de-
clined to 16 percent by 197035 and has declined progressively since that
period. By 1980, only 13 percent of all farmers derived their income solely
from agriculture.3 8
Some other changes in the composition of the farm group, however,
will make trade liberalization more difficult. There has been a pro-
nounced increase in the percentage of farm families involved in the pro-
duction of fresh vegetables, oranges and livestock.3 7 In 1980, 90 percent of
the vegetable and stock farming in Japan was performed by full-time or
nearly full-time male farmers who cultivated 40 percent or more of their
land.38 These sectors have been the principal areas of growth for the agri-
cultural community. Moreover, much of the concentration in citrus 'nd
27 Id. at 228.
8 Fukui, supra note 19, at 136.
29 Id. at 137.
30 F. SANDERSON, supra note 3, at 11.
31 Fukui, supra note 19, at 138.
32 Id.
3 JAPAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPERS OF JAPAN 131 (1980-81)
[hereinafter cited as WHITE PAPERS OF JAPAN].
1, Fukui, supra note 19, at 138.
35 Id.
36 JAPAN ECONOMIC YEARBOOK, THE ORIENTA ECONOMIST 47 (1980-81).
3 Fuku, supra note 19, at 140; FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRI-
CULTURE, FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR 25 (July 1983) [herinafter cited as FOREIGN AGRI-
cULTURE CIRCULAR II].
38 WHITE PAPERS OF JAPAN, supra note 33, at 131.
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livestock production has been promoted by the Japanese government. 9
When the cost to the government of the rice production supports became
unbearable, the government encouraged the rice producers to diversify
their crops.40
The Japanese government, however, has found it increasingly diffi-
cult to resist pressure from the United States for trade liberalization. The
first step toward a partial dismantling of Japanese restrictions and quotas
began in the 1960's when the lemon and banana trades were exempted
from pre-existing barriers. In 1971, Japan liberalized tariffs on 45 of 73
agricultural products.4 An additional four products were released from
restrictions in 1972.42 The remaining products subject to quotas involve
principally meats, fruits, and vegetables, which constitute the area of
growth for the agricultural sector in Japan.
The three Japanese quota restrictions that perhaps affect U.S. agri-
cultural products most severely are those imposed on citrus, beef, and
tobacco. The Japanese restrictions are particularly onerous in that they
combine both quantitative limitations and high duties.4
The quota on fresh oranges, set at 15,000 metric tons in 1977, was
scheduled to expand to 83,000 metric tons in 1983.4 4 This larger quantity,
however, will still constitute a small percentage of total Japanese Mikan45
production. During the preceding eight years, this percentage has been as
low as 0.2 percent.46
Mikan producers have resisted U.S. requests for further liberalization
of the citrus trade.47 Japanese farmers, who in recent years have ex-
panded domestic production, claim that additional imports would depress
prices and make it difficult to justify their production levels. These alle-
39 F. SANDERSON, supra note 3, at 21-22; FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR II, supra note
37, at 25-26.
40 Egaitsu, supra note 15, at 175-178.
41 Fukui, supra note 19, at 149.
42 Id.
41 For example, imported oranges are subject to both a quota and 40 percent duty dur-
ing the period from December 1 to May 31 each year. FRUIT AND VEGETABLE DIVISION, FOR-
EIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, CITRUS IN JAPAN: AREA PRODUCTION TRADE 19-20 (Mar. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as CITRUS IN JAPAN]. Beef is likewise subject to a quota and tariff duties of
25 percent. F. SANDERSON, supra note 3, at 22.
" R. SINHA, JAPAN'S OPTIONS FOR THE 1980's, at 105 (1982).
41 Eighty-five percent of Japan's orange production consists of Unshu-Mikans which is
considered to be more a tangerine than an orange. Twenty-five percent are canned. Half of
that total is shipped to the United States. See CITRUS IN JAPAN, supra note 43, at 2-5.
4 See FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR I, supra note 1, at 72. Even if liberalization of
trade restrictions permitted orange imports to double, U.S. oranges would still only consti-
tute 5 percent of the supply in Japan.
"I Interview with Iwao Yamaguchi, Senior Managing Director of Japan's Central Union
of Agricultural Cooperatives-Zenchu in 18 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA),
No. 14, at 554 (Jan. 11, 1983); FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR I, supra note 1.
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gations appear largely groundless. Statistics suggest that imported or-
anges are not likely to adversely affect Japanese Mikan production.48 Re-
tail prices in Tokyo for domestic and imported oranges demonstrate that
imported oranges sell at prices two to five times higher than domestic
fruit.49 Moreover, imports have steadily increased as restrictions have
permitted, despite a forty percent tariff during the marketing season for
Mikans. 5°
Restrictions and high tariffs on other products, such as grapefruit,
are even more difficult to justify. Japan does not produce grapefruit,"' but
nevertheless, imposes a high duty on imported grapefruit: 25 percent ad
valorem.5 ' Citrus juices are also subject to restriction. A 30 percent tariff
is imposed and imported juices must be blended in mixtures containing
at least 40 percent domestic juices."' Orange juice imports, moreover,
have been limited to 600 metric tons and were scheduled to increase to
6,500 metric tons in 1983.54 Even that level is low given that Japanese
consumer demand for orange juice is in excess of 104,000 metric tons
annually. 55
Similar restrictions exist on the importation of beef. The entire 1978
quota for high quality beef was 16,800 metric tons.58 This level was sched-
uled to increase to 30,800 metric tons in 1983.57 Severe import restrictions
and a 25 percent duty on imports have sustained Japanese beef prices at
levels three to four times higher than equivalent U.S. product prices.5 s
Moreover, the number of beef cattle in Japan has declined as approxi-
mately two-thirds of production now comes from dairy herds.59 In light of
expected growth in meat demand,6 0 the restrictions and duties on beef
imports are a significant levy on Japanese consumers while simultane-
48 See FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR II, supra note 37, at 26, 28.
49 CITRUS IN JAPAN, supra note 43, at 23.
10 Id at 19-21.
5' S. Res. 462, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S11465-466 (daily ed. Sept. 14,
1982).
5' FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT ON AGRICUL-
TURAL CONCESSIONS IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 89 (June 1981).
53 JAPANESE BARRIERS TO U.S. TRADE, supra note 6, at 11.
R. SINHA, supra note 44, at 105.
11 FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR II, supra note 37, at 29. The 104,000 metric ton
figure was calculated by multiplying the 5 kilogram per capita consumption of orange juice
in Japan by the population in Japan (104 million), yielding a figure of 520,000 metric tons.
This figure was then divided by an approximate conversion factor of 5 because the Circu-
lar's statistics were stated in fresh tons.
:6 R. SINHA, supra note 44, at 105.
57 Id.
:8 F. SANDERSON, supra note 3, at 22.
9 d.
'0 Id. at 56-57.
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ously posing a substantial obstacle to improving trade relations with the
United States.
The restrictions on tobacco control have been equally encompassing.
The Japanese policy incorporating high tariffs and distribution restraints
has been a source of friction between the United States and Japan for a
number of years.
Japan's policy on tobacco imports was unilaterally modified by Japan
in 1980 after two years of consultations with the United States. In No-
vember 1980, Japan made several concessions which led to the termina-
tion of two actions initiated by U.S. producers"' under the mechanism of
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.62 As a result of this agreement, Ja-
pan has reduced the tariff on cigarettes, cigars and pipe tobacco, and has
permitted greater market access for foreign products.6 3 Measures were
taken to reduce the price differential between imported and domestic cig-
arettes and the number of retailers permitted to sell imported cigarettes
was increased. These concessions, together with the grant of permission
given to U.S. producers to use Japanese language media for advertising,
provided for a substantial lessening of restrictions on imports.0 ' However,
significant impediments to Japan's tobacco market remain. Although the
duty on imported cigarettes was reduced from 90 percent, 5 on April 1,
1981, it still remains at a comparatively high level of 35 percent ad
valorem e6
The resistance of Japanese farmers to the liberalization of trade
stems from the large price differential between Japanese and foreign agri-
cultural products. 7 The price differential reflects the higher cost of pro-
duction in Japan. For example, it costs three to four times as much to
61 On March 14, 1979, the Cigar Association of America, Inc. filed its petition (relating
to cigars) under the Trade Act of 1974. The Associated Tobacco Manufacturers filed a simi-
lar petition (relating to pipe tobacco) on October 22, 1979. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES 5 [hereinafter cited as SECTION 301 TABLE OF
CASES]. These petitions were subsequently accepted by the Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative. See 44 Fed. Reg. 19083, 64938 (1979).
62 This provision, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411-2416 (1976), permits a private party to
petition the United States government to initiate an investigation to determine whether
alleged trade practices are unreasonable, unjustifiable or discriminatory and a burden on
U.S. commerce. If the President determines that the statutory criteria are met, he must
initiate action to resolve the dispute or take retaliatory action.
63 SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, supra note 61, at 5.
64 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, OPERATIONS OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 32D
REPORT, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 1307, at 150 (1982) [hereinafter cited as OPERATIONS OF THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM]. See also 18 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA),
No. 5, at 159 (Nov. 2, 1982).
6 Japan's Tariff Reduction on Items of U.S. Interest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press
Release 3 (Dec. 25, 1982).
66 Id.
'7 See, e.g., supra note 17; supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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raise wheat or beef in Japan as it does in the United States.6 8 Japanese
agricultural products are not competitive with U.S. products and, there-
fore, Japanese farmers favor import restrictions.
III. QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) specifically
prohibits the establishment of quantitative restrictions by contracting
parties."9 Blatant quota limitations, such as those that the Japanese have
imposed on imports of citrus, beef, and tobacco products, are prohibited.
Article XI of GATT contains a general prohibition on quantitative
restrictions.70 The limitation placed on the use of quotas by contracting
parties was intended to eliminate the most pernicious of trade barriers.
Unlike other impediments to trade, including high tariffs which may
serve to deter imports or limit demand depending upon the price elastic-
ity of the particular imported product, quotas operate to eliminate en-
tirely the functioning of comparative advantage in the market place. The
use of quotas and other quantitative restrictions therefore was limited
under GATT.
Article XI also provides three specific exceptions to the general rule
against the use of quotas. First, export restrictions are permitted to re-
lieve food shortages.7 1 Second, restrictions that are necessary to the appli-
cation of domestic standards are sanctioned.7 2 Third, import restrictions
on agricultural and fishery products are allowable when they are neces-
sary for the enforcement of government measures.
73
The first and second exceptions which permit the establishment of
quantitative restrictions in the instance of food shortages or as necessary
to the implementation of standards, are inapplicable to Japan's quotas on
citrus, beef, and tobacco.74 The third exception also is irrelevant to Ja-
pan's import quotas on specialty products and beef.
75
68 See Fukui, supra note 19, at 150.
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter cited as GATT], opened for
signature, Oct. 30 1947, art. XI, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
70 Id. at art. XI, para. 1.
71 Id. at art. XI, para. 2(a).
712 Id. at art. XI, para. 2(b).
73 Id. at art. XI, para. 2(c).
"' Citrus imports from those parts of California affected by the medfly in 1981-1982
were temporarily banned. The duration of the prohibition on imports was considered by
many U.S. officials to have been excessive. See FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR I, supra
note 1, at 20.
70 This exception is not relevant because Japan has not imposed restrictions on either
beef production or tobacco processing. Although the further expansion of Mikan orange pro-
duction is discouraged, the import restrictions predated such domestic control measures.
1983
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The third exception is only applicable in situations when the govern-
ment action is intended to restrict the quantity of domestic production or
marketing, or reduce a surplus through distribution to domestic consum-
ers at prices below market value .7  The Japanese restrictions fulfill
neither of these requirements. Japan has not discouraged the domestic
production of citrus, beef or tobacco products, and prevailing prices for
these commodities exceed international prices. Moreover, if Japan were to
impose quantitative restrictions on its domestic production of Mikan or-
anges,7 quotas on imports should be permissible under Article XI only if
they were applied without altering the relative balance between domestic
production and imports.7 8 The precise market share of imports relative to
exports is difficult to establish when quotas have always been a part of
the import scheme.
A much broader exception to Article XI's prohibitions on quantita-
tive restrictions is contained in Article XII. 79 The imposition of quotas
and similar devices is permitted by Article XII when required by balance
of payments considerations or other external factors affecting a con-
tracting party's monetary reserves.8 0 Article XII specifically sanctions im-
port restrictions when either a serious decline in monetary reserves is
threatened or a reasonable increase in reserves is necessary.81 Article
XVIII sets forth an even more expansive balance of payments defense for
developing countries.8 2
The balance of payments basis for quantitative restrictions is inap-
plicable to Japan since it has accumulated substantial monetary reserves
and enjoyed trade surpluses in recent years.83 In fact, the International
Monetary Fund determined in 1963 that Japan's use of quota restrictions
could no longer be justified on the basis of balance of payments deficits.8 4
This finding was noteworthy because Article XV, paragraph 2, of GATT
states that contracting parties should accept the findings of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund regarding the criteria of Article XII, paragraph
2(a).
See FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR II, supra note 37, at 25.
71 GATT, supra note 69, at art. XI, para. 2(c).
77 Citrus production grew rapidly, expanding by a factor of seven from 500,000 in 1955
to 3.4 million tons in 1973. F. SANDERSON, supra note 3, at 11.
7 GATT, supra note 69, at art. XI, para. 2(c).
79 Id. at art. XII. Article XII permits an exception to Article XI's prohibition of quanti-
tative restrictions in those situations where action is necessary to prevent further erosion of
a balance of payments position or a deterioration in monetary reserves.
80 Id. at art. XII, para. 1.
81 Id. at art. XII, para. 2(a).
82 See Id. at art. XVIII (particularly sections A, B, and C).
83 See R. SINHA, supra note 44, at 108-09.
84 See TRADE STRATEGY WITH JAPAN, supra note 11, at 2.
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The scope of Article XI's prohibition on quantitative restrictions has
been defined in several working party papers. A 1950 working party pa-
per 5 on quantitative restrictions determined that programs similar to Ja-
pan's restrictions on certain agricultural imports were inconsistent with
GATT. 8 Such unsanctioned use of quantitative import restrictions are an
appropriate basis for recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism of the
Agreement. 7
The working party specifically identified three different practices
which it determined to be abuses of the provisions of Articles XI and XII
which permit quantitative restrictions in certain narrowly defined situa-
tions 8 The first type of practice examined by the working party has sev-
eral similarities with Japan's quota on orange imports. For example, the
maintenance of quantitative restraints which provide favored treatment
for imported products which are either non-competitive or less competi-
tive with a domestic industry were considered to contravene the Agree-
ment. Japan limits orange imports in exactly this manner by permitting
the majority of imports under its quota to be entered only during those
months which do not correspond to the Mikan marketing season.
In conclusion, the working party decided that quotas which are not
justified by the balance of payments provisions of Article XII or other
provisions of the Agreement specifically permitting the imposition of
quantitative restrictions were a violation of GATT.
Prior to the U.S. government's action in 1983 to seek GATT consul-
tations on quotas affecting 13 products, Japanese import restrictions had
been the subject of only two actions under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974.89 Both of those proceedings involved tobacco products. The first of
the actions, for which a petition was received by the United States Trade
Representative on March 14, 1979, contained allegations that the Japa-
nese government's tobacco monopoly maintained unreasonable restric-
tions, established excessively high prices and unfairly limited advertising
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT/CP/4/33/Add. 1 (Apr. 5, 1950).
88 See Id. at 7.
87 Id.
88 Id. These practices are: (1) the maintenance of balance-of-payments restrictions giv-
ing priority to imports of products based on the competitiveness or non-competitiveness of
such imports with a domestic industry; (2) the imposition of administrative obstacles to the
full utilization of balance-of-payments import quotas; and (3) quantitative restrictions im-
posed as a means of retaliation against a country refusing to conclude a trade agreement
with the country concerned.
89 See supra note 61. Two additional actions were undertaken relating to discrimina-
tory agreements between Japan, Korea, Brazil and the PRC regarding thrown silk imports
and Japanese quotas on leather imports. Both issues were resolved during consultations be-
tween the two countries and did not proceed to dispute settlement. See SECTION 301 TABLE
OF CASES, supra note 61, at 3-4.
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and distribution of imported cigars.90 Consultations were initiated with
Japan toward a resolution of these issues in 1979. The second proceeding,
pertaining to pipe tobacco, involved allegations identical to those relating
to cigars.9 1 Initial consultations with Japan on the restrictions imposed on
imported pipe tobacco were unsuccessful and actions on the two cases
were combined for purposes of dispute settlement under Article XXIII,
paragraph 2, of GATT. Both cases were withdrawn in January, 1981 when
Japan agreed to ameliorate the market restrictions and to reduce the ap-
plicable tariff duties.2
The citrus and beef industries in the United States sought the inter-
vention of the federal government in their efforts to eliminate Japan's
remaining agricultural quotas.93 Action by U.S. government is unlikely,
however, before the expiration of the 1979 Strauss-Ushiba Agreement.9 4
Japan, of course, is not the only country to use protectionist devices
to secure the well-being of its agricultural sector. The United States also
imposes limitations on beef imports. The Meat Import Act of 197995 re-
stricts imports of beef to 1.224 billion pounds annually. It is evident, how-
ever, that the U.S. quota permits an import volume in excess of the
30,800 tons which will be permitted by Japan in 1983. In fact, the U.S.
quota was not filled during the years 1980, 1981 or 1982.
Other U.S. restrictions have impeded the free flow of trade. The
United States has quantitative restrictions on several commodities in-
cluding cotton, sugar, peanuts, certain potatoes and certain fish." The
only GATT action in which a contracting party was authorized to with-
draw previously negotiated concessions in retaliation for damage suffered
from quantitative restrictions on imports came in an action by the
Netherlands against U.S. dairy quotas.9 7
Since 1955, however, U.S. restrictions have been safe from challenge
90 SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, supra note 61, at 5.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Trade, Finance and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Comm., 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 172-174 (1981) (testimony of the California-Arizona Citrus League).
04 The Strauss-Ushiba agreement provided for a gradual liberalization of Japanese im-
port quotas over a five year period culminating in April, 1984. 18 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S.
EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), No. 4, at 157 (May 3, 1983).
95 Meat Import Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-177, § 1, 93 Stat. 1291 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1202).
96 R. SINHA, supra note 44, at 70
97 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Doc-
UMENTS 31-32 (Ist Supp. 1953) [hereinafter cited as GATT, BISD with corresponding sup-
plement reference]; GATT, BISD 28 (2d Supp. 1954); GATT, BISD 46 (3d Supp. 1955);
GATT, BISD 31-32 (4th Supp. 1956); GATT, BISD 28-29 (5th Supp. 1957); GATT, BISD
14 (6th Supp. 1958); GATT, BISD 23-24 (7th Supp. 1959).
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as the result of a GATT waiver granted in that year. 8 The waiver was
given in part to avoid a U.S. defection from GATT at a time when the
world economy was recovering from World War II. A conflict between
GATT Article XI and U.S. legislated quotas under section 22 of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act 99 was thus avoided. This accommodation was not
without cost. Although the waiver empowered the United States to pro-
tect its agricultural sector and remain relatively free from international
challenge, a situation was created in which other contracting parties were
unwilling to abide Article XI's restraints as long as the United States was
authorized to act freely to protect her own domestic agricultural
producers.
The United States, however, has not been the sole recipient of a
waiver. Other waivers have benefited Belgium,100 Luxembourg,' and the
Federal Republic of Germany.' 0 2
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: AT THE CROSS-ROADS
Despite import quotas on several important agricultural products,
Japan is an enormous market for U.S. farm products.'0 3 This trade, of
course, has been mutually beneficial.
Improvements in the standard of living in post-war Japan stimulated
changes in diet and consumption patterns necessitating either the pro-
duction of a more diversified grocery basket in Japan or an expansion of
imports. The laws of comparative advantage dictated that the most cost
effective means of filling this consumer demand was through purchases
abroad given Japan's limited amount of arable land and its high cultiva-
tion costs. U.S. farmers benefited from this expanded trade by marketing
harvests which otherwise might have become unmarketable surpluses.
Japan is the world's largest net importer of agricultural goods,
purchasing approximately fifteen percent of total U.S. farm exports.10 4 In
:8 GATT, BISD, supra note 97, at 32 (3d Supp. 1955).
99 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1982). The issue, however, has not disappeared. The appropriateness
of the waivers' continuance is under discussion. See 19 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA), No. 23, at 859 (Sept. 13, 1983).
10 GATT, BISD, supra note 97, at 22 (4th Supp. 1956).
10, Id. at 27.
102 GATT, BISD 31 (8th Supp. 1960). The waivers granted to Belgium, Luxembourg
and the Federal Republic of Germany were granted with the expectation that the restric-
tions imposed during the period of balance of payment difficulties would be removed within
a comparatively short time period as economic conditions permitted.
203 During the first six months of 1983, U.S. agricultural exports to Japan totaled $2.8
billion. Exports of corn and soybeans accounted for nearly one-half of that total. President
Reagan Visits Japan and Korea, supra note 9, at 5.
"0 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Agriculture of the Senate Comm. on Ag-
riculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982) (statement by R.E. Ander-
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1976, it was estimated that one out of every twenty acres in the United
States produced agricultural products for consumption in Japan. In fact,
U.S. exports to Japan are heavily skewed toward non-manufactured
goods. 10 5 Primary products account for 61 percent of U.S. exports to Ja-
pan 06 with one-third of total U.S. exports consisting of agricultural
goods. 10 7 The tremendous volume of U.S. farm exports enabled the
United States to finance in part the imports of Japanese manufactured
products. U.S. farm exports also had a liberalizing influence on U.S. trade
policy at a time when many U.S. industries were seeking protection from
competition with foreign manufactured products.
However, as U.S. farmers increasingly encountered barriers to agri-
cultural exports, their support for liberalized trade with Japan dimin-
ished. The lopsided structure of U.S.-Japanese trade, whereby Japan im-
ported low value primary products from the United States, virtually
excluded some commodities and exported high value manufactured prod-
ucts, was quickly seized upon by U.S. farm groups as a means of applying
leverage to eliminate Japanese quotas and other import restrictions. The
fruit, tobacco, and livestock groups which have traditionally supported
unencumbered trade used the relative openness of U.S. markets for Japa-
nese manufactured products in seeking to exert pressure for a reduction
of both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in Japan. The sheer volume of
Japan's exports of manufactured goods made this possible. Forty-six per-
cent of Japanese exports consists of machinery and transportation prod-
ucts while an additional 30 percent consists of other manufactured
goods.'08 The United States purchases 25.6 percent of these exports.'
Several Japanese economists have supported U.S. demands for liberaliza-
tion of Japanese agricultural quotas because of the perceived retaliatory
threat to Japanese exports of manufactured products.
10
The perceived inequity in Japan's trade policy of promoting exports
while limiting or sometimes prohibiting imports has become highly visible
in the agricultural sector."' Cautious steps have been taken by Japan to
son, Assistant Administrator, International Trade Policy, U.S. Department of Agriculture);
see also F. SANDERSON, supra note 3, at 1.
105 See Houck, Agreements and Policy in U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade in U.S.-
JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL TRADE RELATIONS 59 (E. Caste & K. Hemmi ed. 1982).
"06 R. SINHA, supra note 44, at 54. Primary products include foodstuffs, raw materials
and fuels. Id.
1* Houck, supra note 105, at 59.
108 R. SINHA, supra note 44, at 46.
109 Id.
110 See 18 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), No. 15, at 594 (Jan. 18,
1983).
II See SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH
CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON TRADE MISSION TO FAR EAST 8 (Comm. Print 1981) wherein it
was stated: "A major, gradual restructuring of Japan's agricultural system is the single most
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eliminate its barriers to agricultural trade. However, the slowness with
which Japan has acted and the irrelevancy of some of its concessions has
caused further controversy."
2
Japan's first significant step toward a reduction in trade barriers was
made during the Strauss-Ushiba talks""3 and the Tokyo Round of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN).1 4 During the MTN, Japan
promised to increase quota levels for high quality beef to 30,800 metric
tons and for citrus products to 83,000 metric tons by 1983.115 Further ne-
gotiations were scheduled for early 1983.
Additional concessions were made in late 1981. On December 16,
1981, Japan indicated that it would review its remaining 27 import quotas
and accelerate duty reductions agreed to during the MTN.26 Less than
one week later, on December 21, Japan announced that the duty reduc-
tions scheduled to take effect during 1983 and 1984 would be expedited to
April, 1982.11"
Such concessions, though unilateral, were perceived to be inadequate
by the United States. The growing trade imbalance with Japan coupled
with the recent large harvests in the United States culminated in in-
creased pressure for removal of all trade barriers restricting imports into
Japan. In 1982, the United States advised Japan that action must be
taken to eliminate the restrictions on imports or else reciprocal restric-
important step Japan can take to remove its worldwide reputation as an unfair, one-way
trading partner."
112 In December 1982, reductions of tariffs on 228 items were announced including re-
ductions on 35 agricultural items of interest to the United States. If approved by the Japa-
nese Diet those reductions will take place April 1, 1983. With the exception of a major
reduction in the duty on tobacco, all other changes were minor in effect. See JAPANESE BAR-
RIERS TO U.S. TRADE, supra note 6. The Japan - United States Economic Relations Group or
"Wisemen's Group" established by former President Carter and the late Prime Minister
Ohira, issued a report on January 7, 1981, recommending that Japan eliminate restrictions
on agricultural imports, reduce price supports to levels consistent with world prices and
restructure its agriculture to be more competitive. OPERATIONS OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM, supra note 64, at 154.
113 Japan announced in the Strauss-Ushiba communication the elimination of import
quotas on 11 agricultural and fishery products and an expansion of the import quotas on
beef, oranges, and orange and grapefruit juice. See R. SINHA, supra note 44, at 104-105.
14 The concessions made by Japan included a reduction of duties on meat, poultry,
vegetable oil and fruit products. The most important of the actions involved the establish-
ment of a zero duty rate on soybean imports. See Sanderson, Managing Our Agricultural
Interdependence in U.S.-JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL TRADE RELATIONS 393, 422 (E. Caste & K.
Hemmi eds. 1982).
115 R. SINHA, supra note 44, at 105.
116 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM,
U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 1308, at 148 (1981).
117 Id.
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tions would be adopted by the United States. 118 A fourteen point list
which included requests for liberalization of trade in oranges, citrus
juices, beef, and tobacco products was presented. U.S. requests for further
liberalization of import quotas have met with only limited success. Talks
during October, 1982 in Hawaii ended abruptly when U.S. negotiators
walked out over continued Japanese intransigence."" Despite further dis-
cussions during Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Washington in Janu-
ary, 1983 and U.S. Trade Ambassador William Brock's trip to Japan in
February, 1983, no progress has yet been made toward an elimination of
the existing trade barriers."2"
Japan's restrictions on imports of citrus 'products, beef, and tobacco
products will continue to have a deleterious effect on trade relations be-
tween the two countries. The restrictions are important for two reasons.
First, the quotas preclude an expansion of trade between the countries
which would significantly benefit both U.S. agricultural producers and
Japanese consumers. Second, the restrictions have become symbolic of
what many Americans perceive as Japan's exploitation of other country's
markets while its own borders remain closed. The reciprocity and domes-
tic content legislation introduced in the last two sessions of Congress was
intended to compel Japan to open its markets to U.S. products.1 21
Ambassador Brock's testimony before the Senate Finance Subcom-
mittee on International Trade, 22 reflected the growing American impa-
tience with foreign trade restrictions. The spate of reciprocity bills intro-
duced during the 97th Congress confirms this frustration.123 Several of
the bills were directed to Japan specifically. 2' House of Representatives
Bill 5614 was intended to provide for fair trade between the United
States and Japan, and the bill would require the President to limit Japa-
nese exports to the United States when U.S. traders encountered a Japa-
nese trade barrier, or when Japanese exporters competed with the benefit
XIS Id. at 151; See also U.S. Will Take Farm Import Quota Issue to GATT, Asahi Eve-
ning News, Apr. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
I'l 18 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), No. 4, at 119-120 (Oct. 26, 1982).
120 See 18 INT'L TRADE RE. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), No. 15, at 593-594 (Jan. 18,
1983); Japanese Government's January 13, 1983, Statement on Open Market Initiatives and
Related Materials, Id. at 615, 617.
" Trade, Defense Issues Fray US.-Japan Ties, 40 CONG. QUATELY, No. 48, at 2903,
2905 (Nov. 27, 1982).
122 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), No. 401, at 757-58 (Mar. 30, 1982).
123 See Reifman, Reciprocity in Foreign Trade, Issue Brief No. IB82043 (Oct. 13, 1982)
(published by Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress); Flirting with Reci-
procity-New U.S. Trade Policy Makes Some People Nervous, NATIONAL JOURNAL 320-324
(Feb. 20, 1982); S. Res. 462, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S11465 (daily ed. Sept. 14,
1982).
124 H.R. 5614, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982); H.R. 5616, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982).
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of unfair advantages bestowed by their government. 125 Alternate propos-
als would provide for a two year duty increase for certain Japanese prod-
ucts. 126 Some draft legislation introduced during the 97th Congress was
directed broadly at foreign restrictions on agricultural imports. Thus,
House Bill 5860 and House Bill 6072 would have required the President
to take action against countries which did not permit open access for U.S.
agricultural products.12 7
The dispute with Japan arises at a time when U.S. agriculture con-
fronts a difficult financial environment. U.S. farm exports are encounter-
ing barriers to many previously open markets and are confronted by com-
petitors who are often heavily subsidized. These developments cannot
help but have an impact on the U.S. farm community's support for open
markets. Any defection of the farm community from the defense of liber-
alized trade is likely to have severe repercussions for U.S. trade policy
and will add one additional issue to other disagreements already affecting
trade relations between Japan and the United States.
The dispute with Japan accentuates a perception in the United
States that international rules of trade formulated under GATT only
benefit other countries and have not worked to provide the United States
with access to foreign markets.1 2 ' This view is reinforced by the failure of
GATT to encompass foreign investment and services trade which are
more important than merchandise trade for many non-agricultural sec-
tors of the U.S. economy, and, in addition, the unwillingness of U.S. trad-
ing partners to expand GATT to cover such trade. The focus on Japanese
restrictions also comes at a time when the GATT dispute settlement pro-
cedures appear to be of diminishing value.129 The 1983 panel report in the
wheat flour case"s ° confirmed this view. There is thus reason to believe
that a failure by the Japanese to open their markets to U.S. agricultural
products will result in a further deterioration in trade relations, and a
concomitant reinforcement of protectionist force in the United States.
125 The bill was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means on February 24, 1982,
but was not enacted during the Congressional session.
126 H.R. 5616, supra note 124.
1.7 H.R. 5860, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H950 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1982)
(introduced by Rep. Bereuter); H.R. 6072, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. RE C. H1427
(daily ed. Apr. 5, 1982) (introduced by Rep. Coelho).
128 See 18 INr'L TADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), No. 24, at 972-74 (Mar. 22,
1983).
129 Id.
120 Final Draft of GATT Dispute Panel Findings on U.S. Complaint Concerning EC
Subsidies of Wheat Exports, Mar. 3, 1983, reprinted in 18 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA), No. 25, at 1047-1055 (Mar. 29, 1983).
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V. CONCLUSION
Seemingly irresistible political and economic forces are propelling the
two countries on a collision course. The Liberal Democratic Party, depen-
dent upon the farm vote, has been reluctant to make sacrifices which
would seriously affect the Japanese agricultural community. The United
States, which has an enormous merchandise trade deficit with Japan,
partly because of the comparative openness of U.S. markets, is indignant
over Japanese unwillingness to open its own borders to American agricul-
tural goods which have a demonstrated comparative advantage. These
forces have provided and will continue to provide increased momentum
for the impetus behind the demand for trade reciprocity and a disman-
tling of Japan's trade barriers on agricultural products.
